The Supreme Court reaffirmed that when a High Court declines to quash an FIR, it cannot simultaneously grant anticipatory bail, emphasising that the accused must first seek pre-arrest bail before the Sessions Court.
“It cannot be denied that provisions of pre-arrest bail are applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Hence, any person accused of an offence if desirous of seeking such protection would be required to avail the appropriate remedy by approaching the competent Sessions Court at the first instance. To grant the relief of pre-arrest bail in a criminal writ petition while refusing to exercise jurisdiction to quash the proceedings is totally unacceptable and impermissible”, observed a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta.
While considering the complainant’s appeal against the orders of the Allahabad High Court, the Bench observed that although the High Court declined to quash the FIR, it nonetheless extended blanket protection from arrest to the accused until the filing of the charge sheet. The Supreme Court held that such a direction was unjustifiably prejudicial to the investigation and lacked any rational basis or reasoning.
Reiterating its consistent position, the Court relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, where a three-judge Bench led by former CJI Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud ruled that once a petition seeking quashing under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is dismissed or disposed of, the High Court cannot grant protection from arrest or order that “no coercive steps” be taken during the investigation—whether until its conclusion or until submission of the final report/charge sheet under Section 173 CrPC.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and remanded the case for a fresh adjudication of the quashing petitions on their merits. It further directed that the interim protection already granted to the accused-respondents would remain in force during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court. The Court also requested the High Court to dispose of the matter preferably within four months from January 7.
