The Court said there must be references to specific words used, contextual details or any gestures that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty.
The Supreme Court has clarified that Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalizes actions that insult a woman’s modesty, cannot be invoked solely on the basis of using “obscene language.” The provision requires contextual elements or accompanying expressions that reflect an intent to insult a woman’s modesty [Mashushree Datta vs. State of Karnataka].
A Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Pankaj Kumar Mishra emphasized the importance of providing specific references to the words used, along with contextual details or gestures—whether preceding, accompanying, or following such words—that demonstrate a criminal intent to insult modesty.
“The term “filthy language,” when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC,” the Court said.
The Supreme Court was reviewing a case involving an employee who alleged she was forcibly terminated from her job, with her employer confiscating her laptop containing intellectual property. She further claimed that security personnel escorted her out of the office premises.
The employee also accused two senior colleagues of using abusive language during the termination process.
An FIR was registered against the accused under Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of peace), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 509 (insulting the modesty of a woman) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
After the High Court declined to quash the FIR and chargesheet, the accused approached the Supreme Court seeking relief.
The Supreme Court dismissed the charges under Section 509 of the IPC, ruling that the appellants’ actions did not demonstrate the intent or awareness necessary to reasonably infer that their conduct could provoke a significant emotional response amounting to an insult to a woman’s modesty.
The Court observed that the woman’s complaint did not suggest the accused used language specifically directed at her that would constitute an offence under Section 509 of the IPC.
The Court further noted that although the chargesheet claimed the accused had scolded the complainant using “filthy language,” this allegation was not included in the FIR.
“The absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the chargesheet: there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have not been disclosed,” the Court ruled.
The Supreme Court clarified that a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, which pertains to causing hurt, requires evidence of a voluntary act that results in bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to another person. Therefore, actual harm must be demonstrated.
Regarding the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506, the Court emphasized that it must be proven that the accused intended to cause alarm to the complainant for the charge to be valid. In the absence of such evidence, the Court quashed both charges.
For Section 504 of the IPC (intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of peace), the Court stated that it must be established through evidence that the insult was intentional and carried out with the intent or knowledge that it would provoke a disturbance of public peace or lead to another offence.
The Court concluded that none of the essential elements of Sections 323, 504, 506, or 509 of the IPC were met, even if the complainant’s allegations were taken as entirely true.
