The Court faulted the police and the trial court for charging a man with voyeurism merely for filming a woman entering a disputed property
The Supreme Court has ruled that photographing or recording a woman without her consent, when she is engaged in activities in a public or non-private space, does not constitute voyeurism under Section 354C of the Indian Penal Code [Tuhin Kumar Biswas vs. State of West Bengal].
A bench of Justices NK Singh and Manmohan quashed the case against a man accused of voyeurism for filming a woman while she was entering a disputed property. The Court observed that both the police and the trial court should have exercised greater caution before filing the chargesheet and framing voyeurism charges, especially given the lack of any substantial basis for the allegation.
The Court further observed that pursuing prosecutions without a solid basis of strong suspicion imposes an undue burden on the criminal justice system and diverts resources from more significant cases.
The case arose from a prolonged dispute between two brothers over a residential property in Salt Lake, Kolkata. The accused, Tuhin Kumar Biswas, is the son of one of the co-owners, and the FIR was lodged in connection with this property conflict.
The dispute began in 2018, when the accused’s father filed a civil suit against his brother. On November 29, 2018, the civil court ordered both parties to maintain joint possession of the property and prohibited the creation of any third-party rights.
This injunction was still in effect when the complainant, Mamta Agarwal, visited the property in March 2020. Shortly thereafter, she lodged an FIR—allegedly at the prompting of the accused’s uncle—claiming that Biswas had unlawfully restrained and threatened her and had taken photographs and videos of her without consent.
On August 16, 2020, the police filed a chargesheet under Sections 341 (wrongful restraint), 354C (voyeurism), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC, despite the complainant’s refusal to record a judicial statement.
After the trial court and the Calcutta High Court both rejected his plea for discharge, the accused approached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court began by outlining the legal principles for discharge, emphasizing that a case should proceed to trial only when the prosecution’s evidence raises a strong suspicion that the accused may have committed the offence. At this stage, the Court noted, the judiciary acts as a filter to prevent weak or baseless cases from going to trial.
The Bench then considered whether the FIR and chargesheet established the offence of voyeurism. It clarified that voyeurism applies only when a woman is observed or photographed while performing a private act—such as undressing, using the bathroom, or engaging in sexual activity.
In this case, the Court noted that there was no allegation indicating that the complainant was involved in any such private act. It further observed that, although the High Court had already recognized that the FIR did not disclose the offence of voyeurism, it still refused to discharge the appellant—a decision the Supreme Court found unsustainable.
With respect to the charge of criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the IPC, the Court noted that the FIR did not allege any threat to the complainant’s person, property, or reputation—an essential component of the offence.
The Court also considered the allegation of wrongful restraint. It observed that there was no evidence showing the complainant was a tenant; the records indicated that she had merely visited the property as a prospective tenant to inspect it.
The Court further noted that permitting a tenant to enter would have violated the civil court’s injunction. Accordingly, it concluded that the accused had acted under a bona fide belief that he was entitled to prevent entry into the property in light of the existing injunction.
In this context, the Court held that the FIR arose solely from the family’s ongoing civil dispute over the property. It observed that, even if the allegations were accepted as true, they concerned matters that should be resolved through civil remedies—such as injunctions or applications in the pending suit—rather than through criminal proceedings.
The Bench also criticized the routine filing of chargesheets in cases where there is no substantial basis of suspicion, noting that such practices place an unnecessary burden on the criminal justice system.
“The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system. It forces Judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that are likely to result in an acquittal. This diverts limited judicial resources from handling stronger, more serious cases, contributing to massive case backlogs. Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge framing stage as to whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that the State should not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the right to a fair process,” the Court said.
Consequently, the Court upheld the appeal and acquitted the appellant of all charges.
